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I.

Introduction
Federal agents arrested Johnbull Osagiede, a Nigerian national,
on March 13, 2003, but did not inform him of his right to consular
assistance under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations.2
While this failure of notification violates the
requirements of Article 36, 3 courts disagree on the existence of an
individual enforceable right under the Convention 4 and the proper
way to vindicate a violation.5 This disagreement generally
prevents a person in Osagiede's position from seeking a remedy
I 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2008).
2

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77,

596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
3 Id. at 1(d).
4 See infra Part IMl.
5 See generally Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (holding that
suppression of the evidence was not an available remedy for a violation of Article 36).
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based on an Article 36 violation.6 However, the Seventh Circuit's
decision in Osagiede v. United States makes a remedy available
for Article 36 violations as part of a constitutional Sixth
Amendment argument.
Part II of this Note outlines the facts and decision in Osagiede
and discusses the reasoning behind the Seventh Circuit's decision.
Part III examines the background law embedded in the Supreme
Court's decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,' the decisions of
the other United States Courts of Appeals, and the Seventh
Circuit's previous decisions. Part IV analyzes Osagiede's effect
on future Article 36 claims in the United States federal court
system. Finally, Part V concludes with the decision's likely
impact on counsel for foreign nationals and the possibility of
effective protection of the right to consular assistance in the future.
II. Statement of the Case
A. The Facts
Federal law enforcement officers arrested appellant Johnbull
Osagiede, a Nigerian national, on drug charges in 2003' without
informing him of his right to consular assistance under Article 36
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rights.1"
During a
"controlled buy" arranged by federal agents, Osagiede exchanged
twenty-five grams of heroin with Michael Braxton for $3,000 in
cash in a Sears parking lot in Chicago, Illinois. 1" Federal agents
arrested Osagiede on March 13, 2003 and on March 18 charged
him, along with two co-defendants, with four counts of heroin
distribution and conspiracy to distribute heroin.12 On January 9,
2004, Osagiede plead guilty to one count of distributing twentyfive grams of heroin after his attorney, Kenyatta Tatum, advised
Osagiede he would receive only eighteen months of jail time.13
6

Id.

See Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2008).
8 Id.
7

9 Id. at 404.
10 Id. at 402 ("The Government conceded that it failed to inform Osagiede of his
right, in clear violation of the Article 36.").
11 Id. at 404.
12 Id.
13

Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 404.
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During this time, Osagiede's counsel neither informed him of his
rights under Article 36 nor raised the issue to the Government or
the presiding judge. 14 At the sentencing hearing, the Government
intended to show through co-defendant testimony that Osagiede
distributed 1300 grams of heroin with the corroboration of nine
wiretapped recordings.15 The strong Nigerian accent of the
speaker on the tapes made it difficult to identify the voice and
Osagiede denied that the voice belonged to him. 16 To dispute the
tapes, Tatum convinced Osagiede to hire an expert to analyze the
tape recordings; the expert analyzed one tape and found that the
voice did not belong to Osagiede. 7 The Government admitted that
this tape did not contain Osagiede's voice, but the court allowed
the other eight recordings into evidence and determined the base
offense level as thirty-two.18 The district court judge sentenced
Osagiede to ninety-seven months in prison, less than the
sentencing recommendation for a base offense of thirty-two. 9
B. The DistrictCourt Decision
Osagiede did not appeal this sentence, but filed a pro se
petition for a writ of habeas corpus2" in the Northern District of
Illinois on April 25, 2006, arguing a denial of his Sixth
Amendment 2' right to effective assistance of counsel because of
counsel's failure to notify him of his rights under the Vienna
Convention and counsel's failure to raise that issue at trial.2 2 The
district court denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
Judge Korcoras explained that since dismissal of the indictment is
not a recognized remedy for an Article 36 violation, it would have
been "extremely unlikely that a motion to dismiss the indictment

14 Id.

15 The Government needed corroboration in part because Braxton previously
mistook Osagiede for his cousin, Akeem Lasisi, and because the phone number Braxton
called to set up the deals could belong to either Lasisi or Osagiede. Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 405.

19 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 405.
20 See 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2006).
21 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
22 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 405.
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by Osagiede's attorney would have been successful."23 Osagiede
appealed this determination to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit.24
C. The Seventh CircuitDecision
The Seventh Circuit construed Osagiede's petition liberally
because he filed pro se.25 The court determined that despite asking
for the incorrect type of remedy in his application for appeal,
"Osagiede alleged a recognized and undisputed violation of his
rights, under the federal regulation if not under the Convention
itself." 26 This finding by the court entitled the petitioner to a
review of the decision from the district court.
The court began by instructing on the position of the Vienna
Convention under federal law.
The Convention "is an
international treaty that governs relations between individual
nations and foreign consular officials., 27 Since the United States
ratified the treaty in 1969, the Convention became the "supreme
Law of the Land."28 Next, the court looked to the codification of
the right to consular assistance in federal regulations for law
enforcement agencies. 29 These regulations included a specific
instruction by the U.S. Department of State: "When foreign
nationals are arrested or detained, they must be advised of the right
to have their consular officials notified."3 Finally, in its analysis
of the importance of the consular assistance, the court expresses
concern that in some cases consulates may be the only venue
through which a foreign national can obtain assistance, as when
evidence may be found only in the home country. 3 Thus, a
Id.
Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 402 (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 366 (2006)).
28 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 402 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
29 The court looked at regulations that required conformity with Article 36 for the
Department of Justice, 28 C.F.R § 50.5 (2003), and for the Immigration and
Naturalization Service, 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2003). Id.
30 Id. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUB. No. 10518, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
23

24

AND ACCESS: INSTRUCTION FOR FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL ENFORCEMENT AND OTHER

13-15 (Jan. 1998)).
Id. at 403-04 (quoting Linda Jane Springrose, Note, Strangers in a Strange

OFFICIALS REGARDING FOREIGN NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES
31
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foreign national's lack of access to his consulate may form the
basis for prejudice by eliminating key evidence from the trial. 3 2
The court distinguishes this case from the Sanchez-Llamas
decision in order to refute the Government's contention that
Sanchez-Llamas "forecloses foreign nationals from bringing
ineffective assistance of counsel claims based on Article 36
violations."33 The court first notes that Osagiede makes a Sixth
Amendment claim, not a claim under the Vienna Convention, thus
subjecting it to an analysis under Strickland v. Washington and not
Sanchez-Llamas.34 The existence of rights and remedies under the
Vienna Convention thus remains "relevant only to the extent that it
helps prove or disprove one of these elements."35 Furthermore, the
decision in Sanchez-Llamas suggests other remedies instead of
suppression, including "rais[ing] an Article 36 violation as a part
of a broader constitutional challenge, such as a challenge to the
voluntariness of a statement under the Fifth Amendment. 36 The
Seventh Circuit likens such a Fifth Amendment argument to the
use of the Sixth Amendment in Osagiede's case3 7 and finds
authorization for the use of a Sixth Amendment claim in the text
of the majority decision, 38 as well as in Justice Ginsburg's
concurrence. 39 In addition, the court notes that discussion of the
Sixth Amendment claim "was no accident" and that "the viability
Land: The Rights of Non-Citizens Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
ConsularRelations, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 185, 196 (1999)). The court also provides a
specific example from a Supreme Court case where another suspect in the crime fled to
the home country of Honduras before trial. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331,
341 (2006).
32 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
33
34
35
36

Osagiede, 543 F.3d. at 407.
Id. at 405 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).
Id. at 406-7.
Id. at 407 (citing Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350).

Id. at 407.
In particular, the Seventh Circuit emphasized the Supreme Court's statement that
"an attorney's failure to raise an Article 36 violation would not be 'cause' for overriding
a state's procedural default rules, unless 'the attorney's overall representationfalls
below what is requiredby the Sixth Amendment."' Id. (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548
U.S. at 357 n.6 (emphasis added)).
39 The court refers to Justice Ginsburg's note that, "nothing prevented [Bustillo]
from raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim predicated on his trial counsel's
failure to assert the State's violation of those rights." Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 407 (quoting
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 364 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
37
38
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of ineffective assistance of counsel claims had been discussed
extensively at oral argument."4 ° The court concludes by deciding
that Sanchez-Llamas does not foreclose a foreign national from
making an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on Article
36 violations; rather, the court fmds that the case "appears to
express a preference for subsuming Vienna Convention claims in
broader constitutional attacks, rather than basing relief entirely on
the treaty itself."'"
After finding authorization for a Vienna Convention claim
based on constitutional grounds in the Supreme Court's decision
in Sanchez-Llamas, the Seventh Circuit analyzed the Sixth
Amendment claim. The court relied on Strickland to assert that
"the right to counsel [under the Sixth Amendment] is the right to
effective counsel."42 Thus, violation of the statute depends on the
actions of the claimant's counsel. In addition, the court stated that
foreign nationals in the United States are entitled to protection by
the Sixth Amendment during criminal prosecution.43 The Sixth
Amendment protection therefore extends to Johnbull Osagiede, a
Nigerian national criminally prosecuted in the United States.
The Seventh Circuit next determined the appropriate standard
of review. The appellate court conducts a de novo review of the
legal issues in the district court's decision for abuse of discretion.'
The court must decide whether a § 2255 motion requires an
evidentiary hearing by determining whether the record
"conclusively show[s] that the prisoner is entitled to no relief. '4 5
The court of appeals then stated that the dependence of an
ineffective assistance claim on facts not entirely on record often
requires an evidentiary hearing.46
The court goes on to analyze the claim under the Strickland47
two-prong test to review the denial of an evidentiary hearing by
the district court. The first part of the Strickland test asks if
40
41
42

Id. at 407.
Id. at 408.
Id. at 406.

46

Id. (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896)).
Id. at 408.
Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 408 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b)).
Id. (citing Shaw v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994)).

47

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

43
44
45
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"counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness when measured against 'prevailing professional
norms."' 48 For this inquiry, the court begins by stating that "[t]he
law was on the books; the violation was clear. Simple computer
research would have turned it up."4 9 In other words, Osagiede's
counsel had access to multiple sources of information that
informed him of his client's right to consular assistance. The court
gives as evidence of the law's clarity and accessibility the
relatively recent decision in Sanchez-Llamas referring to Article
36 rights. 0 The court also notes the decisions in three Illinois
district courts that held that the Vienna Convention created
individually enforceable rights, refuting the government's
contention that counsel was not objectively deficient because
counsel could not make an argument based on violation of the
Convention.51 Further evidence of the notice to counsel of the
petitioner's rights includes the previous discussion of federal
regulations requiring compliance with Article 36.52 Finally, cases
such as Breard v. Pruett53 and Murphy v. Netherland54 recognized
Vienna Convention as commonplace and
claims under the 55
counsel.
to
available
Based on this analysis, the Seventh Circuit concluded that
counsel to a foreign national "should have known to advise their
clients of the right to consular access and to raise the issue with
the presiding judge., 56 The court noted but one exception to such
a Sixth Amendment claim: a strategic decision by counsel not to

48

Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 408 (citing Strickland,466 U.S. at 687-96).

49 Id. at 409.

Id. at 409 n.7.
51 Id. at 410 (citing United States ex rel. Madej v. Schomig, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20170, at *3 (N.D. IIl. 2002); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933
(C.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (C.D.
1ll.1999)). The court also refers to the decisions in several district courts throughout the
United States that held the Vienna Convention conferred individually enforceable rights.
See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
52 See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
50

134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998).
116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997).
55 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 411 n. 12 (citing Breard,134 F.3d at 619-20, Murphy, 116
F.3d at 100).
56 Id. at411.
53

54
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raise an Article 36 violation, as in Sanchez-Llamas. 7 In analysis
of the record, the court found no evidence of such a strategic
decision by Osagiede's counsel or evidence that counsel knew of
Article 36.58 Unable to find evidence regarding these two facts,
the court concluded that when "the record contains insufficient
facts to explain counsel's actions as tactical," as in this case, there
generally must be an evidentiary hearing. 9
Finally, the court turned to the second prong under the
Strickland test, where it must determine if "but for the deficient
performance, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of
the proceeding would have been different."'6 Since the court had
previously determined that Sanchez-Llamas need not foreclose a
remedy under Article 36,61 the court continues by identifying
possible remedies, including informing the defendant of his rights
under the Convention and raising the issue with the judge. 62 The
failure of counsel to seek these two possible remedies "precluded
Osagiede from exercising his63 right to consular assistance and may
well have been prejudicial.,
To determine if this failure of counsel requires an evidentiary
hearing on the existence of prejudice, the court looked to the
record for evidence of the type of assistance Osagiede might
receive from the Nigerian consulate.64 In particular, the court
noted the analysis of the tape recordings as a possible area where
the Nigerian consulate might provide the funds or expertise
necessary for proper analysis. 65 The court also suggested that the
57 Id. (citing Mark J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas andArticle 36 of
the Vienna Convention: The Supreme Court, the Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27
MICH. J. INT'L. L. 1185, 1219 (2006)).
58 Id. at 411.

59 Id. at 412 (citing United States v. Leonti, 326 F.3d 1111, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)).
60 Id. at 408 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984)).
61 See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
62 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 412. The court refers specifically to the potential reaction
of a trial court to such a violation; it "'can make the appropriate accommodations to
ensure that the defendant secures, to the extent possible, the benefits of consular
assistance."' Id. (quoting Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006)).
63 Id.
64 Id. at 413. To show that concrete prejudice flowed from the deprivation of his
right to notification, Osagiede must explain the nature of the assistance he might have
received had he been alerted to his Article 36 rights. Id.
65 Id. The court suggests the Consulate may assist with the identification of
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Nigerian consulate might assist by locating Osagiede's cousin,
Akeem Lasisi, in Nigeria. 6 These factors appear to show the
Nigerian consulate's ability to assist Osagiede and "[go] a long
way toward showing that he deserves an evidentiary hearing."67
However, the court determined that while the Nigerian consulate
could have assisted Osagiede,6" the petitioner must also show that
the consulate would have helped him.69 No "credible assertion of
the assistance the consulate would have provided" appears in the
record and the court instructs the petitioner to provide such an
assertion for the district judge to entitle him to an evidentiary
hearing.7"
The court remanded the case to the lower court to determine
whether Osagiede's counsel made a strategic decision not to raise
the violation in the trial court and to explore a possible assertion of
the consulate.
III. Background Law
A. An Individual Enforceable Right
In general, courts disagree or choose not to rule on the
existence of an individual enforceable right under the Vienna
Convention.71 In Sanchez-Llamas, the controlling decision on this
issue, the Supreme Court found it "unnecessary to resolve the
question whether the Vienna Convention grants individuals
enforceable rights"72 because the court concluded that the
petitioners are not entitled to relief on their claims.73 Despite its
refusal to address the question, the Court assumed that Article 36
creates such an individual enforceable right for the purposes of its

regional dialects, analysis of the voices, or translation. Id.
66 Id. The court notes the previous mistaken identification of Lasisi for Osagiede
and the discrepancy in ownership of the telephone number where Braxton made the calls.
Id.
67 Id.
68 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 413.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Kadish, supra note 57, at 1194.
72 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006).
73

Id.
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analysis of the petitioner's claims.74 A majority of the federal
courts of appeals do not recognize an individual enforceable right,
but rather assume it as the Supreme Court did in SanchezLlamas.75 A minority of courts have definitively stated that the
Vienna Convention does not create an individual enforceable
right. 76 Finally, several district courts have found that the Vienna
Convention does confer individually enforceable rights. 77
The Seventh Circuit, in contrast to the other Courts of Appeals78
and the Supreme Court and in unison with several district courts,
recognizes an individual enforceable right conferred by the Vienna
Convention in Jogi v. Voges.79 In this case, the Seventh Circuit
looks to the plain language of the treaty: "Article 36 P1(b) states,
plainly enough, that authorities 'shall inform the person concerned
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.""'8 The court
rejects the idea that the language of the preamble shows a lack of
individually enforceable rights.8 Finally, the court in Jogi refers
Id.
Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 409 & n.7 (citing Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376
(1998) (per curiam)); United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir.
2001); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1255-56 (10th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d 1194, 1196 (lth Cir. 2000); United States v.
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 885 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); United States v. Li,
206 F.3d 56, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2000); Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 99-1000 (4th
Cir. 1997)). See also United States v. Ortiz, 315 F.3d 873, 886 (8th Cir. 2002).
76 See, e.g., Cardenas v. Dretke, 405 F.3d 244, 252 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392-93 (6th Cir. 2001).
77 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 410 & n.6 (citing Standt v. City of New York, 153 F.
Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y 2001); United States v. Briscoe, 69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745-46
(D. V.I. 1999); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d 931, 933 (C.D. I11.
1999;, United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass. 1999); United
States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (D. V.I. 1999); United States v.
Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. lll. 1999); United States v.
$69,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1998); United States
v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095-96 (S.D. Cal. 1998)).
78 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74
75

480 F.3d 822, 836 (2007)
Id. at 833 (citing Vienna Convention, supra note 2 (emphasis added)).
81 See Jogi, 480 F.3d at 833-35. The language of the preamble reads as follows:
"Realizing that the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit
individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions by consular posts on
behalf of their respective states." Id. at 833 (citing Vienna Convention, pmbl., Apr. 24,
1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 3-4, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (emphasis added)). The court regards the
preamble as unnecessary for analysis because of the clarity of language in Article 36.
79
80
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to the Supreme Court statement that, "'a treaty should generally be
construed . . . liberally to give effect to the purpose which
animates it and that even where a provision of a treaty fairly
admits of two constructions ... the more liberal interpretation is to
be preferred.' 8 2 Considering all of these factors, the court
determines that "Article 36 confers individual rights on detained
nationals."83 This decision in Jogi distinguished the Seventh
Circuit from its sister circuits and the Supreme Court on the issue
of individually enforceable rights under the Vienna Convention.
B. Remedies for Violation of the Right
The remedies for a violation of Article 36 discussed in
Osagiede take two forms: general remedies and judicial remedies.
The decision in Sanchez-Llamas discusses such general remedies:
"[i]f [the defendant] raises an Article 36 violation at trial, a court
can make appropriate accommodations to ensure that the
defendant secures, to the extent possible, the benefits of consular
assistance."84 In the case of one petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas,
Mario Bustillo, the Honduran consulate executed an affidavit that
"'it would have endeavored to help Mr. Bustillo in his defense'
had it learned of his detention prior to trial."85 In addition to this,
the majority opinion in Sanchez-Llamas notes that "diplomatic
avenues-the primary means of enforcing the Convention-also
remain open."" Such actions can remedy a violation before a
conviction or adverse sentencing occurs.
An obstacle exists to the second remedy to Article 36
violations, judicial remedies, in the form of procedural bars. A
procedural bar occurs because a state prisoner must exhaust all
available state remedies before he can apply for federal habeas
relief.87 The Supreme Court analyzed such a case in Breard v.
Furthermore, the court suggests that the preamble refers to the Convention's position as a
benefit to the official consular position, but not to diplomats in a private capacity. Jogi,
480 F.3d at 833.
82 Jogi, 480 F.3d at 834 (quoting United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 368
(1989)).
83 Id. at 834.
84 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006).
85
86
87

Id. at 341 (quoting J.A. at 74, Bustillo v. Johnson, No. 05-51 (U.S.)).
Id. at 350.
See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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Greene"8 and found the petitioner's habeas motion based on
Article 36 procedurally barred because he did not raise his claim
in trial or on appeal in state court.8 9 Similarly, the lower Virginia
court denied the second petitioner in Sanchez-Llamas, Mario
Bustillo, a habeas corpus claim because of the procedural bar.90 In
Sanchez-Llamas, the Supreme Court dismissed decisions by the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) that criticized the application
of these procedural default rules. The ICJ reasoned that such rules
"prevented [courts] from attaching any legal significance to the
fact that the violation of Article 36 kept the foreign governments
from assisting in their nationals' defense."'" However, the Court
maintained that ICJ decisions are not controlling over Supreme
Court decisions.92 In this way, procedural bars prevent U.S. courts
from exploring judicial remedies to a Vienna Convention violation
because it precludes the court from hearing the claim.
Examples of judicial remedies for a violation of Article 36
include requests for suppression of evidence and private actions.
In Sanchez-Llamas, the first petitioner, Moises Sanchez-Llamas,
contends that suppression of his incriminating statements to the
police is required because the authorities did not notify him of his
rights under Article 36." The Supreme Court distinguishes the use
of suppression as a remedy in this case from authorized use in
cases that "arose directly out of statutory violations that implicated
important Fourth and Fifth Amendment interests."'9 4 The Court
also distinguishes Fourth and Fifth Amendment violations from
Article 36 violations based on the possible effects on testimony
and search and seizure. The Court determined that an Article 36
violation is "unlikely, with any frequency, to produce unreliable
88 523 U.S. 371 (1998).
89 Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 351 (citing Breard,523 U.S. at 375).
90 Id. at 350.

91 Id. at 353 (quoting LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 497, (June
27)).
92 Id. at 355-56.
93 See generally id.
94 Id. at 348. The court notes a case that implicated Fifth Amendment-like issues
when authorities held a defendant for a prolonged period without facing a judge in
violation of a statute. Id. (citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 344 (1943)).
The court also discusses a case based on the Fourth Amendment's protection against
unreasonable search and seizure where the authorities obtained evidence during an
unlawful arrest. Id. at 348-49 (citing Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958)).
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confessions" and has no impact on Fourth Amendment rights. 95
Thus, the Court concludes that suppression is the inappropriate
remedy for an Article 36 violation.
In Jogi, the Seventh Circuit explored a private tort claim for
violation of Article 36 brought by a foreign national under the
Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 96 "which establishes jurisdiction in the

district courts over a civil action by an alien for a tort committed
in violation of a treaty of the United States." 97 The court found the

ATS awarded jurisdiction over claims such as violations under the
Vienna Convention to federal courts.
The Seventh Circuit
determined that the Vienna Convention is self-executing" and that
it creates an individually enforceable right. 99
The court
specifically noted the language of the Vienna Convention that says
the rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article
shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and
regulations of the receiving State, subject to the
proviso, however, that the said laws and
regulationsmust enablefull effect to be given to the
purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.100
With this language in mind, the court determined that the
treaty calls for the existence of a remedy, and since the United
States' courts rejected all other claims including suppression, only
a claim for money damages remained.'0 ' In summation, the court
found that the Vienna Convention allowed a private action for
damages as a remedy.'02
C. Sixth Amendment Use-Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
One early hint of the use of a Sixth Amendment claim in
recognition of a foreign national's rights under Article 36 occurred

95
96

Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 349.
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).

Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 370 (7th Cir. 2005).
98 Id. at 378.
97

99 Id. at 382.
100 Id. at 385 (citing Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36, Apr. 24,

1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (emphasis added)).
101 Id.
102 Id.
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in Murphy v. Netherland.10 3 Despite the court's inability to find a
constitutional claim based on the petition, the court gives a lengthy
discussion on the availability of Article 36 information to
attorneys. °4 Specifically, the court says that "a reasonably
diligent search by Murphy's counsel ...would have revealed the
existence and applicability (if any) of the Vienna Convention" and
that "[t]reaties are one of the first sources that would be consulted
by a reasonably diligent counsel representing a foreign
national."1 °5 Furthermore, the court lists several
federal cases
10 6
preceding this one that involve Article 36 claims.
Another authorization for the use of the Sixth Amendment in
Article 36 claims comes from the decision in Sanchez-Llamas and
referenced in the concurrence by Justice Ginsburg. The decision
in Sanchez-Llamas suggested that a petitioner could vindicate his
rights under the Vienna Convention "as part of a broader challenge
to the voluntariness of [a detainee's] statements to police."'0 7
Justice Ginsburg's concurrence discussed the use of a Sixth
Amendment claim in the case of the petitioner, Bustillo, whose
argument against a procedural bar failed in part because his
attorney, not the United States, neglected to inform him of his
consular rights.10 8 Ginsburg pointed out that "once Bustillo
became aware of his Vienna Convention rights, nothing prevented
him from raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim
103 116 F.3d 97 (4th Cir. 1997). In this decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit rejected a petition for habeas corpus relief from the petitioner's Virginia
conviction and death sentence, holding that the violation of the right to consular
assistance under the Vienna Convention did not constitute a "substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right" of the petitioner and that such a claim is procedurally
barred. Id. at 101.
104 The Fourth Circuit's discussion here, while instructive on the prominence and
accessibility of information regarding Article 36, does not appear to promote a Sixth
Amendment claim.
105 Murphy, 116 F.3d at 100.
106 Id. (citing Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 520 (5th Cir. 1996); Waldron v.
I.N.S., 17 F.3d 511,518 (2d Cir. 1993); Mami v. Van Zandt, No. 89 Civ. 0554, 1989 WL
52308 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 1989); United States v. Rangel-Gonzalez, 617 F.2d 529, 530
(9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Calderon-Medina, 591 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Vega-Mejia, 611 F.2d 751, 752 (9th Cir. 1979)).
107 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 350 (2006). The court does not refer
specifically to the use of the Sixth Amendment here, but refers to use of an Article 36
claim as part of a Fifth Amendment claim.
108 Id. at 364 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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predicated on his trial counsel's failure to assert the State's
violation of those rights."' 9 Thus, the Sanchez-Llamas majority
opinion and concurrence look to constitutional claims underlying
an Article 36 violation and point in the direction of the Sixth
Amendment.
Strickland v. Washington"' controls in a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel case such as Osagiede."1 The
Supreme Court in Strickland examined petitioner's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. " 2 Once the Court determined
that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim existed, 113 it
identified the actions that showed the counsel's performance was
deficient: a "showing that counsel made errors so serious that
counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed by the
Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the
deficient performance prejudiced the defense."' 114 The Supreme
Court notes that an examination of counsel's assistance looks at
"the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts
'
of the particular case."115
This test identifies the standard required
in the Osagiede analysis by the Seventh Circuit.
In Strickland, the Supreme Court notes that respondent's
counsel "made a strategic choice" that corresponded with the other
acts identified in the claim and that the defense "was the result of
'
reasonable professional judgment."116
In addition, because of the
severity of the crimes involved in the case, a sentencing hearing
109 Id. at 364 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
110 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
111 Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating "[blecause
this is a Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel claim, it is controlled by
Strickland and its familiar two-prong test.").
112 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 675 (1984) (stating that there are six
possible examples of ineffective counsel: "fail[ing] to move for a continuance to prepare
for sentencing, to request a psychiatric report, to investigate and present character
witnesses, to seek a presentence investigation report, to present meaningful arguments to
the sentencing judge, and to investigate the medical examiner's reports or cross-examine
the medical experts.").
113 Id. at 686. The Court states that "the Court has recognized that 'the right to
counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel."' Id. (citing McMann v.
Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 n.14 (1970)).
114 Strickland,466 U.S. at 687.
115Id.at 690.
116 Id.at 699.
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"would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented to the
'
sentencing judge."117
The Court's application here requires more
than a showing of minor prejudice to make an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, both in the recognition of counsel's
insufficiency and the resulting prejudice.
Finally, the Supreme Court cautions in Strickland that
"[c]ourts should strive to ensure that ineffectiveness claims not
become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire criminal
justice system suffers as a result."" 8 Such a warning leads to
policy arguments against any case that seeks a new basis for a
Sixth Amendment claim, as in Osagiede."9
IV. Significance of the Case
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Osagiede stands out from
the previous decisions in other circuits and the Supreme Court,
both as a result of its recognition of an individual enforceable right
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, 20 and in recognizing a
claim for the violation of that right.' 2 '
A. An IndividualEnforceable Right
Although Jogi did not control in the Seventh Circuit at the
time of the district court's decision in Osagiede, the court
nonetheless emphasizes in Osagiede"' that it always recognized
the individual rights conferred by Article 36 as implicit in United
States v. Lawal 23 and United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara.24 In
Osagiede, the Seventh Circuit bases its decision on the silence and
117 Id. at 699-700.

118 Id. at 697.
119 See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
120 See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
121 See supra notes 32-41 and accompanying text.
122 Osagiede, 543 F.3d 1045, 409-10.
123 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000). There is, however, little difference
between the treatment of the individual rights issue in Lawal and that in Sanchez-Llamas.
The court in Lawal says that "While some courts, including ours, have had the
opportunity to decide whether Article 36 creates individual rights enforceable in judicial
proceedings, all have sidestepped the issue ... Likewise, we need not decide the issue
today because it does not affect our disposition of this case." Id. This treatment of the
individual rights issue remains similar to the decision in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon. See
supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text.
124 226 F.3d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 2000).
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use of assumptions in the analyses of other court decisions, despite

the two courts that found no individual rights. 125 Moreover, the
courts cited as in agreement with the Seventh Circuit on the
individual rights issue represent district courts in the circuits not
mentioned in the Osagiede analysis. 126 Therefore, while the case
both affirms the Seventh Circuit's previous decisions on the
individual rights issue, it also challenges the silence of the other
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court.
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit noted that the issue of
individual rights does not stand as a requirement to begin analysis
of the Sixth Amendment claim. The court emphasized this point
while distinguishing Sanchez-Llamas from Osagiede's claim,
noting that "[w]hether rights and remedies are available under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention is relevant only to the extent
that it helps prove or disprove one of these elements." 127 Thus, the
court only reaches the issue in its analysis of the reasonableness of
counsel's actions.'28 However, with previous authorities such as
Ginsburg's concurrence in Sanchez-Llamas'29 describing the use
of a Sixth Amendment claim without mention of individual rights
and the comment in Murphy that "[t]reaties are one of the first
sources that would be consulted by a reasonably diligent counsel
representing a foreign national,"13 ' it seems that other courts may
find Sixth Amendment violations without recognizing the
individual rights conferred by the Vienna Convention.
See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
Osagiede v. United States, 543 F.3d 399, 409 n.6 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Standt v.
City of New York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 427 (S.D.N.Y 2001); United States v. Briscoe,
69 F. Supp. 2d 738, 745-46 (D. V.I. 1999); United States v. Miranda, 65 F. Supp. 2d
1002, 1007 (D. Minn. 1999); United States v. Torres-Del Muro, 58 F. Supp. 2d931, 933
(C.D. Ill. 1999); United States v. Hongla-Yamche, 55 F. Supp. 2d 74, 78 (D. Mass.
1999); United States v. Superville, 40 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677-78 (D. V.I. 1999); United
States v. Chaparro-Alcantara, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1125 (C.D. I1. 1999); United States
v. $69,530.00 in U.S. Currency, 22 F. Supp. 2d 593, 594 (W.D. Tex. 1998); United
States v. Esparza-Ponce, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1084, 1095-96 (S.D. Cal. 1998)).
127 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 406-07.
128 See generally id. at 409-10. The court discusses the issue of individual rights
mainly to dispute the Government's contention that any violation raised by counsel
would be futile. Id.
129 See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 364 n.3 (2006).
130 Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997). The comment was
intended to show the likelihood that counsel for a foreign national knows about the
Vienna Convention Article 36 "rights." Id.
125

126
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B. The Sixth Amendment
The Sixth Amendment claim by Osagiede follows almost
directly from Justice Ginsburg's discussion of the failure of
131
Bustillo's trial counsel in her concurrence in Sanchez-Llamas.
The Seventh Circuit in Osagiede refers directly to this
concurrence: "Through ineffective assistance of counsel claims,
"'full effect" could [be] given to Article 36."" 3 In addition, the
Seventh Circuit finds the petitioner's argument for Sixth
Amendment relief rooted in the kind of domestic constitutional
claim that the Sanchez-Llamas majority suggests. 133 As a result,
such referral to Ginsburg's concurrence appears to be a solution to
the search for a claim for Article 36 violations and a development
consistent with the majority decision in Sanchez-Llamas.
Since Strickland forms the root of Sixth Amendment analysis
and the basis for the interpretation in Osagiede,134 an analysis of
their interaction illuminates problems in the use of a Sixth
Amendment claim for vindication of Article 36 rights. Discussion
of the reasonableness of counsel's actions presents a possible
consistency between the two cases in the dependence on
professional norms for analysis. 135 The prejudice question raises
additional problems between the two decisions because the record
lacked enough facts for the court to rule on the prejudice issue in
Osagiede.136 Despite the lack of information, the court suggests
what might pass the prejudice standard: Osagiede must 37
show both
the ability and willingness of the consulate to help him. 1
Another important factor in the analysis of prejudice relates to
a claim that Strickland rejected: the Supreme Court decided that
the attorney's decisions in the respondent's sentencing hearing did
not create the necessary prejudice required because it did not
See supra notes 108-109 and accompanying text.
Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 407 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,
548 U.S. 331, 363-64 & n.3 (2006) (Ginsburg, J., concurring)).
133 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. at 350 ("A defendant can raise an Article
36 claim as part of a broader challenge to the voluntariness of his statements to police.").
134 See supra text accompanying note 106.
135 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 408 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Effective performance by counsel
representing a foreign national in a criminal proceeding is reasonable performance
'under prevailing professional norms,") (quoting Strickland,466 U.S. at 689).
136 Id. at413.
131

132

137 Id.
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significantly affect the respondent's trial.'38 The decision in
Osagiede also related to the sentencing hearing of the petitionerdefendant, but perhaps involves a greater difference in the severity
of penalties as a result of prejudice: the assistance of the consulate
may mean the difference between an eighteen month sentence and
a ninety-seven month sentence. 3 9 Such a distinction between
Osagiede and Strickland perhaps forms the difference in the two
outcomes, but may require more clarification in the interpretation
of the standard.
C. Policy Considerations
One possible impact of the use of a Sixth Amendment
ineffective assistance of counsel claim may include a heightened
burden on lawyers representing foreign nationals. 140
The
possibility of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on
the counsel's failure to raise a Vienna Convention violation at trial
surely provides an incentive for attorneys to both educate
themselves on the rights of foreign national clients and to routinely
raise such a violation if it occurs. However, as the Seventh Circuit
points out, "[s]imple research would have turned up [the Vienna
Convention].' 14' Furthermore, the American Bar Association
disseminates information with guidelines for the defense of
foreign nationals. 142 This information shows that knowing the law
that controls a client's case does not present a novel responsibility
to the criminal trial attorney.
Because of an attorney's ethical commitment to his client,' 43
perhaps placement of the responsibility with a foreign national's
counsel represents the best solution to the violation of Article 36

138

Strickland,466 U.S. at 689.

139 Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 404-5.
140

See supranote 107 and accompanying text.

141Osagiede, 543 F.3d at 409.
142

Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: The Glass is Half Full, 11 LEWIS

& CLARK L. REv. 29, 44 (2007).
143See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).

In its Sixth Amendment
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis, the Supreme Court discusses the duties of a
criminal defense attorney, listing "a duty of loyalty, a duty to avoid conflicts of interest."
Id. at 688. In particular, the Court notes that "[c]ounsel also has a duty to bring to bear
such skill and knowledge as will render the trial a reliable adversarial testing process."
Id.
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rights. Such an imperative to attorneys may lead to consular
involvement at earlier parts of the trial and serve the client better
than information received from the adverse arresting authorities.
Despite the importance of the attorney's knowledge, possible
negative effects of the recognition of this Sixth Amendment claim
include an exaggerated use of a violation of Article 36 rights to
either delay trial action or serve as a precautionary move by the
attorneys.
In the same token, the decision in Osagiede appears to remove
the responsibility for notification of consular rights from law
enforcement. This seems contradictory to the treaty's requirement
that "the competent authorities of the receiving state" inform
foreign nationals in custody of their rights and facilitate consular
communications.144
United States regulations require that
authorities such as Citizenship and Immigration Services' 45 and the
Department of Justice 4 6 comply with the requirements outlined in
Article 36. Additionally, the notification of Vienna Convention
rights seems to intuitively belong with notification of Miranda
rights.
Nevertheless, while Osagiede creates an additional incentive
for attorneys to educate themselves about foreign national clients
and their rights under the Vienna Convention, the case does the
opposite for law enforcement: without the possibility of a claim
against law enforcement agents for a violation, they may continue
to do so. The shift in responsibility from law enforcement to
attorneys may lead to a lack of cooperation between law
enforcement and consulates, as well as the undermining of both
diplomatic relations and the United States criminal justice system.
Such policy issues remain as possible negative impacts of the new
development in Article 36-related claims. These changes may not,
however, represent a drastic shift in the law, since some authorities
suggest that Sanchez-Llamas relieved law enforcement of this
duty. 147 As a result, perhaps Osagiede creates a solution to the
144

Vienna Convention, art. 36, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.

145 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2009).

28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2009).
William E. Thro, American Exceptionalism: Some Thoughts on Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 11 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 219, 221 (2007) ("Consequently, local law
enforcement officials, who perform the vast majority of arrests in the United States, need
not worry about their failure to identify a suspect as a foreign national and to advise the
146
147
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lack of law enforcement responsibility created by Sanchez-Llamas
by placing responsibility in the hands of defense counsel.
V. Conclusion
The Seventh Circuit's decision in Osagiede represents an
affirmation of the court's previous decisions on claims arising
under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, but distances the court
from the Supreme Court and the other courts of appeals, on the
issue of individual rights. Additionally, a decision on individual
rights does not seem necessary to the use of the Sixth Amendment
as basis for a claim to vindicate Article 36 rights. Since the claim
comes from a progression of cases that did not evaluate the
individual rights issue,148 perhaps the use of the Sixth Amendment
in this situation will not require a reexamination of the existence
of individual rights in the Vienna Convention. Furthermore, the
controlling Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance of counsel
case, Sanchez-Llamas, appears to authorize the use in Osagiede.
As a result, the Sixth Amendment claim provides a way for
foreign nationals to vindicate their rights under Article 36 and may
prevent the need for such claims when responsibility for
notification lies with competent counsel.
ANGELA LEE VELEZ

suspect that he may contact his consulate.").
148 See supra notes Part II.A.

